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Abstract 
Jenkins and Van Kerm (2006) show how income inequality trends can be explained by 
income mobility and the equalising effect of panel-income changes. This paper extends their 
framework to show explicitly how the distributional effect of panel-income changes depends 
on the respective size and distribution of income gains and losses. An application to US data 
illustrates the contribution of the approach. One of the new insights of the application to US 
data for the 1970/2009 period is that most of the equalising effect of income growth occurs 
through income gains rather than income losses even in times of recession. The analysis also 
reveals some interesting trends regarding income mobility and the business cycle. 
 
JEL classification: D31, D63 
Keywords: Income inequality, income mobility, income growth
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1. Introduction	
Income mobility and income inequality are two topics that have been the subject of extensive 
research. Although both topics are clearly related, building a bridge between them remains a 
challenging task. The aim of this paper is to propose a new approach capable of explaining 
concomitant changes in income inequality and income mobility. Building on Jenkins and Van 
Kerm (2006) — hereafter referred to as JVK — the new method establishes a direct link 
between income-rank mobility, the distribution of winners and losers (i.e. the distributional 
effect of income growth) and changes in inequality. The application to US data covering the 
period between 1970 and 2009 illustrates how this approach can bring new insights on the 
dynamics of income distribution. 
The relationship between mobility and inequality can be hard to grasp. As Duval-Hernandez 
et al. (2014) point out even a Nobel Prize-winning economist may not understand how both 
inequality and mobility can increase over the same period. Yet, Hernandez et al. (2014, p1) 
indicate that it is not only possible but also common to find increases in inequality even 
though “when we follow the same people over time, those who earned the least to begin with 
gained more in dollars than those who started at the top of the earnings distribution.”  
Partly, this apparent contradiction is due to the fact that “the very concept of income mobility 
is not well-defined” (Fields and Ok 1999, p557). In response a stream of the literature has 
proposed mobility measures that have a clear relationship with inequality measures. 
Shorrocks (1978) popularised the idea that mobility can be measured by the extent to which 
inequality is reduced by an extension of the income-accounting period (see, for example, 
Bayaz-Ozturk et al. 2014 and Kopczuk et al. 2010 for recent applications of Shorrocks’ 
approach to the US).1  
This type of mobility measures bears a clear relationship with inequality measures in that 
more mobility is always synonymous with less inequality. The trade-off, however, is that they 
have distanced themselves from the most intuitive definitions of mobility. JVK addresses this 
limitation in the special case of the widely used Gini index. By drawing on the income tax 
literature, they show that if mobility is simply defined as income reranking the only 
                                                 
1 Recent developments by Fields (2010) and Aaberge & Mogstad (2014) propose new measures of mobility as 
an equalizer of permanent income in an attempt to address the limitation pointed out by Fields (2010, p418) that 
“neither the sign nor the relative magnitudes [of the Shorrocks’ index] conveys any information about whether 
the mobility process is an equalizing or a disequalizing one”. 
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remaining factor that explains changes in inequality is the degree to which income growth 
(i.e., the panel-income changes) is more favourable to the poorer individuals than to the 
richer individuals. 
This paper adopts the same mobility concept as in JVK to propose a new method capable of 
explaining why and how income growth may reduce inequality or, according to JVK, be ‘pro-
poor’. The new method is particularly helpful to shed light on the relationship between 
income mobility and inequality. We depart from JVK by recognising that over any time 
period some individuals will see their income increase while others will experience an 
income loss, and yet other individuals may face no change. It follows that how the income 
growth process affects inequality depends on the respective size and distribution of the 
income gains and losses. Moreover, distinguishing income gains and losses is relevant from a 
social welfare perspective as there is evidence that people treat them differently.2 
One of the major new insights of the application to US data for the 1970/2009 period is that 
most of the equalising effect of income growth occurs through income gains rather than 
income losses, a finding that persists even in times of recession. Finally, income mobility 
shows no clear long-term pattern but it declined during the Great Recession, which is in 
contrast with previous recessions. 
The remaining of the paper is organised as follows. The new method to decompose inequality 
changes is presented in Section 2. The application to US data is discussed in Section 3 and 
Section 4 concludes.      
2. A	new	method	to	explain	inequality	changes	
JVK establish a parallel between observed inequality changes and Kakwani (1984)’s 
proposed decomposition of the redistributive effect of a tax. A change in inequality — either 
the observed change over time in JVK or the change due to the implementation of a tax in 
Kakwani (1984) — can be decomposed into a vertical and a reranking effect. Let Gi denote 
the Gini coefficient of year i incomes and jiC  denote the concentration coefficient for year i 
incomes calculated using year j rankings.3 JVK show that  
                                                 
2 See the literature on prospect theory (e.g. Jantti et al. 2013 or Wodon 2001 p. 451). 
3 JVK shows how their approach can be extended to allow for different degrees of inequality aversion by using 
the generalized Gini coefficient. This extension applies in the same way to the approach laid out in this section. 
Note also that in principle there is an index number issue since the final year could be used as the reference 
point instead of the initial year. However, JVK (p. 536) notes that “in practice this is less important as the 
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G G G R V
where R G C V G C
    
      (1) 
They interpret V as a measure of the progressivity (or the equalising effect) of the income 
changes and R as an index of mobility in the form of reranking. In the context of the income 
tax literature, V is the vertical effect of the income changes as it depends both on the size and 
progressivity of the income changes.   
R is a relative-income-weighted average of changes in social weights. It follows that 
1/M R G  is the asymmetric Gini mobility index discussed in Wodon (2001) and Yitzhaki 
and Wodon (2004). If there is no change in the ranking of the income units, then the mobility 
index equals zero. For instance, this may arise if the loss (or gain) in mean income is equally 
shared by all income units in proportion of their initial income level. By contrast, maximum 
mobility occurs if there is a total reversal in the ranks. As noted by Wodon (2001, p. 454), the 
advantage of this mobility index is that “it takes into account both the level of income of the 
individuals and their ranking in the distribution of income, with the changes in rankings 
which traditionally define mobility being weighted by the changes in income levels”. 
It follows from equation (1) that in the absence of reranking the reduction in inequality is 
entirely determined by the size and progressivity of the income changes as measured by V. In 
this framework, inequality is reduced by pro-poor income changes unless more than offset by 
concomitant income mobility. 
If there is a change in mean income   from year 0 to year 1, V can be rewritten as 
 
1
V K    (2) 
where 1 0 0( ) /      is the proportionate change in the population’s average income and K 
is an index of the proportionality of the income changes defined in a similar fashion as the tax 
progressivity index introduced by Kakwani (1977). Again there is a clear parallel with the 
income tax literature. Kakwani's progressivity measure is defined as the difference between 
the concentration index of taxes and the Gini coefficient for pre-tax income. However, an 
adaptation is required here since Kakwani’s index is not designed to deal with bidirectional 
income changes, such as the typical panel-income changes. This issue is examined in the 
                                                                                                                                                        
forward-looking perspective is the natural one to use when examining (the progressivity of) income growth over 
time.” 
6 
 
income tax literature interested in the effect of net taxes (taxes minus benefits). Crucially, 
Lambert (1985, 2001) shows that Kakwani’s approach is ill-suited to examine the 
progressivity of net taxes since the sign and the value of the index are unstable as the average 
net tax approaches zero. This implies that the index of the proportionality of the income 
changes, K defined in equation (2), is unstable for small average income changes.  
This explains why JVK do not introduce a distinction between the magnitude and the 
progressivity of the income changes but focus instead on the index V, which subsumes both 
of these aspects. Yet, such a distinction has proved to be useful in the income tax literature as 
the same level of redistribution can be achieved through a small but highly progressive 
income tax or a large but barely progressive income tax. Similarly, one would expect that the 
same reduction in inequality could be achieved by either limited income growth 
disproportionally concentrated among the poor or substantial income growth only mildly 
concentrated among the poor.  
Hence, we depart from JVK’s framework to explicitly distinguish income gains and losses 
and to show their separate distributional consequences. By drawing a parallel with the 
treatment of net taxes in the income tax literature (see Lambert, 1985), we obtain 
 
1 1
l g
l g
VE VE
l gV P P
l g l g
    
  (3) 
where l is the average income loss as a share of year 0 income and g is the average income 
gain as a share of year 0. More specifically, let denote itx  the income of individual i in period 
t, l and g are 
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0 1
1 0
1
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N x 
    (4)  
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i i
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i i
x x I
N x 
    (5) 
where (.)I  is an indicator equal to 1 if (.) is true and 0 otherwise. Kakwani’s 
disproportionality indices lP and gP  are defined in the usual sense as the concentration index 
of income gains (or losses) minus the Gini coefficient for year 0 incomes. The difficulty 
mentioned above in the definition of K is avoided as income gains (and income losses) all 
imply an income change in the same direction. Equation (1) still applies and equation (3) 
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simply provides a meaningful interpretation of V by stating that it is the sum of the equalising 
effects of income gains and losses. More specifically, the degree of redistribution achieved by 
the income changes depends on (i) the size of the income gains, (ii) the extent to which they 
are more concentrated among poorer individuals than among richer individuals (i.e. their 
regressivity), (iii) the size of the income losses and (iv) the extent to which they are more 
concentrated among richer individuals than among poorer individuals (i.e. their 
progressivity). The vertical effect of income losses gVE encompasses (i) and (ii), while lVE
summarises (iii) and (iv).  
3. Changing	 income	 inequality	 and	 mobility	 in	 the	 US	 between	
1970	and	2009	
The data source for this application is the US Panel Study on Income Dynamics (PSID), as 
released in the Cross National Equivalence File (CNEF) (Burkhauser et al. 2001). The 
measure of income for each individual is based on the post-tax post-transfer annual income of 
the household to which they belong. Household income is adjusted for differences in 
household size by dividing by the square root of the household size, a commonly used 
equivalence scale. All incomes are converted to 2009 dollars using the consumer price index, 
negative incomes are recoded to zero, individuals of all ages are included and all calculations 
use sample weights. Standard errors for all estimates are obtained by using the bootstrap 
resampling methods described in Van Kerm (2013) and Saigo, Shao and Sitter (2001). 
The data cover the period from 1970 to 2009 with yearly data between 1970 and 1997 and 
biennial data after 1997. Hence, we carry out decompositions over successive two-year 
periods with one exception, the 1984–1987 period, to allow for the switch from even to odd 
years.4 The period of analysis is marked by six recessions in 1973–75, 1980, 1981–82, 1990–
91, 2001 and 2007–09 according to the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). 
Table 1 shows the estimates of inequality changes and their decomposition for each two-year 
period between 1970 and 2009. Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of inequality 
changes, the reranking index R and the vertical effects of the income gains, gVE , and income 
                                                 
4 Unlike Jenkins and Van Kerm (2006), income is not averaged over three years in order to better assess the 
influence of short-term income changes and the business cycle on inequality and mobility measures. 
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losses, lVE . Figure 2 shows the evolution of the regressivity of the income gains (– gP ) and of 
the progressivity of the income losses lP. 
The results show that most of the redistributive effect of the panel income changes occurs 
through income gains rather than income losses (see Table 1 and Figure 1). And this finding 
is independent of the business cycle. These findings represent new insights in the dynamics 
of income distribution. They show, perhaps unexpectedly, that whether the economy is 
growing or contracting, most of the equalizing effect of the panel-income changes is 
attributable to income gains rather than income losses. There are two main reasons to explain 
the dominance of income gains. First, income gains are larger than income losses on average, 
a mere reflection of the positive income growth observed over most sub-periods. Second, and 
most importantly, the disproportionality of income gains with respect to initial incomes (i.e. 
their regressivity) is systematically greater than the progressivity of income losses (Figure 2). 
In other words, it is essentially because income winners are disproportionately found in the 
lower part of the income distribution that panel income changes reduce inequality. 
The roles of income gains and losses in explaining the equalising effect of panel-income 
changes show — perhaps surprisingly — little sensitivity to the business cycle. This is 
despite the fact that (as expected) average income losses tend to increase and income gains 
tend to fall in recessions. This pattern, however, is somewhat offset by the tendency of 
income gains to become more concentrated at the bottom of the income distribution in times 
of recession (with the exception of the double-dip recession of 1980 and 1981–82, see Figure 
2). As for the progressivity of income losses, that is the extent to which losses tend to be 
more concentrated among richer individuals than among poorer individuals, it increased in 
the last three recessions (1990–91, 2001 and 2007–09), which contributed to reinforce the 
equalising effect of income losses.  
A long-term increasing trend in income inequality starting from the early 1980s is clearly 
evident from Table 1. This trend is consistent with the dynamics of panel-income changes as 
it coincides with an increasing trend in income reranking contributing to an increase in 
inequality, which was only partially offset by the increased redistribution achieved through 
panel-income changes. We also note that there are seven two-year windows in which 
inequality decreased and they all correspond to an entry into recession with only two 
exceptions, the 1976–78 and 2001–03 periods. Interestingly, however, the double-dip 
recession of 1980 and 1981–82 does not coincide with a reduction in inequality unlike other 
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recessions, perhaps suggesting that recessions triggered by a tightening of monetary policy 
have specific distributional consequences.  
Finally, we note that the reduction in mobility, as measured by the normalized reranking 
index M, observed in the 1980s (and also found by JVK) was only temporary. The decrease 
in mobility was reversed between the late 1980s and the early 1990s. Mobility then plateaued 
until it started to decline again between 2003 and 2009.     
4. Conclusion	
This paper extends the method proposed by Jenkins and Van Kerm (2006) to reconcile two 
closely-related concepts whose interactions are often poorly understood, namely income 
mobility and income inequality. The extension is particularly useful to understand the 
interrelated dynamics of income mobility, inequality and growth. The application to the US 
based on data from 1970 to 2009 shows that if panel-income changes (i.e. income growth) are 
equalising it is largely due to income gains rather than to income losses, a finding that also 
applies in times of recession. A valuable avenue for future research is to examine how taxes 
and transfers affect mobility and alter the extent to which the income growth process 
contributes to inequality trends.  
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